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Two Theories of Action Sentences• 
Michael L. Geis 
The philosopher Anthony Kenny (1963: 151-70) has noted that 
two important semantic problems are presented by the fact that 
sentences can contain a variable number of adverbial modifiers. 
Sentences (1)-(3) illustrate this variability for sentences containing 
-the action verb stumbled, 
(1) John stumbled, 
(2) John stumbled in the park. 
(3) John stumbled in the park a:t noon. 
The first problem Kenny notes applies only if ve treat the adverbials 
that occur in sentences like (2) and (3) as arguments of th~ main 
verb, as is the case, for example, in Case Grammar (Fillmore 1968). 
This problem is that ve shall have to represent stumbled as a one-
place predicate in (1), as a two-place predicate in (2), and as a 
three-place predicate in (3). But, as Kenny notes, this is tantamount 
to claiming that stumbled is a different relation in each of the above 
sentences. 
The second problem posed by data like (1)-(3) derives from the 
fact that (3) entails (l)· wid (2) and (2) entails (1). As Kenny 
notes, if we treat the adverbials that occur in (2) and (3) as 
arguments of the main verbs we shall be unabie to account for these 
entailments unless ve appeal to some novel semantic device or devices 
(say axioms or rules of inference) that have the effect of stripping 
stumbled of its adverbial arguments. 
There exists an alternative theory of the adverbials that occur 
in sentences like (2) and (3) that solves the first of Kenny's 
problems, but not the second. This ·theory is usually referred to 
as the "higher sentences" theory of adverbials. According to George 
Lakoff (1970) a sentence ·like (3) is derived from an underlying· 
structure something like (4), 
(4) (sAt (8In (8Stumbled John8 ), the parks), noons) 
The "higher" sentences analysis of time and place adverbials  
clearly solves the first problem Kenny raises, for stumbled can  
uniformly be treated as a one-place predicate. On the other hand,  
this type of wialysis cannot account for the entailment relations  
that we observed to obtain among the sentences (1)-(3) without  
appealing to some ~ovel semantic device or devices that strip the  
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semantic representations underlying sentences like {2) and (3f of  
their.higher sentences.  
I would like to.turn nov to consider two alternative analyses  
of sentences containing time and place adverbials which are designed  
in part to solve both of Kenny's problems •. The first is an analysis  
of action sentences advanced by Donald Davidson (1967t 1969) and  
recently defended by Gilbert Harman (1972), The second is a more  
· general analysis of sentences containing time and place adverbials 
first advanced by me at the,1973 vinter meeting of the LSA {M, Geis 
1974a). 
Davidson takes the position that action sentences refer to 
actions {vhich he takes to be a species of events) in something like 
the sense that ordinary concrete noun phrases refer to material 
obJects. He further argues that time and place adverbs are not verb 
modifiers but are, instead. predicates of the actions that action 
verbs describe. As Davidson notes, action sentences do not contain 
a term in surface structure that makes reference to the actions 
described or which time and place adverbs could be construed as 
predicates of. His proposal is that ve provide such a term in the 
logical forms of action sentences vhich, vithin the framevork of 
a transformational grammar, could be said to be obligatorily deleted,1 
Returning to the examples with which ve bege.nt Davidson wo~ld  
provide {5) as the logical form for {3}.  
(5) 	 (3:x) ((Stumbled (John, x) & In (x, park) & 
At (x, noon)) 
It should be clear that Davidson's analysis solves both of the 
problems that Kenny has raised insofar as they concern time and place 
adverbials •. The verb stumbled vill be treated uniformly as a tvo-
place predicate in the representations of (1)-(3), and the fact 
that {3) entails both {1) and (2) can be accounted for without 
appeal to novel semantic devices. As a. result, Davidson's ane.lysis 
has a clear semantic edge over both the verb-modifier and "higher 
sentence" analtses of time a.nd place adverbials. The question must 
be asked, hovevert whether Davidson's analysis of action sentences 
can be motivated on syntactic grounds.· Davidson baa given one clear 
case of a syntactic argument for his analysis and Harman, who contends 
that Davidson's analysis is compatible vith vhat is known of English 
syntaxt he.s provided a sample transformational derivation. In Yhat 
follows, I show that Davidson's syntactic argument is faulty, and 
that He.nnan's proposal concerning the derivation of action sentences 
is totally untenable. I ·shall then ehow that Davidson's analysis 
is semantically defective, Fi~ally, I shall provide a sketch of 
an alternative analysis which, a:lthough not without problems of its 
own, seems to me to be more promising than the analysis proposed by 
Davidson. 
As far as I can determine, Davidson {1967: 84) provides only  
one direct syntactic argument for his analysis of action sentences.  
This argument is based on an alleged parallel betveen data like (6)  
and {7).  
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(6) r bought a house--it is downtown and it has four 
bedrooms. - . -. . 
(7) 	 John stumbled--he did it in.the park and ne did !:t 
at·noon. 
It is clear, I think, that the it that occurs in (6) not only refers 
back to the phrase a house but is also referential. Davidson holds 
the view that the two occurrences of !l in (7} function similarly. 
According to this view, these two occurrences .of it are referential, 
referring to what John did. If Davidson is right:-ve might take the 
two occurrences of it in (7) as providing direct evidence of the 
presence in underlying structure of the extra term Davidson would 
assign to the action verb stumbled. The difficulty with Davidson 1s 
argwnent is that there is every reason to believe that the two 
occurrences of it in (7) are neither anaphoric nor referential. 
It is characteristic· of genuine anaphoric pronouns that they 
are plural when their antecedents are plural or conjoined, as is 
true in the underlined occurrences of they in (8). 
(8) 	 I bought a house and Mary bought a house~-they 
are both downtown and they both have four 
bedrooms. 
As the deviance of (9) shows, conJoined action sentences are not 
pronominalized by plural pronouns. 
(9) *John stumbled and Bill stumbled--they did~ 
in the park and they did~ at noon. 
. . 
I am inclined to believe that the unacceptability of (9) is evidence 
that we are not dealing vith an anaphoric pronoun in the case of the 
tvo occurrences of it of (7). 
In Ross' (1972Janalysis of action sentences, he formalized the 
rule that gives rise to the two occurrences of it that we find in 
(7) as a clause pronominalization rule, even though he refers to this 
rule as S Deletion. There are, it seems to me~ tvo reasons to 
believe that this rule is in fact a clause deletion rule. The first 
reason is t~at if ·it were a pronominalization rule, it should be the 
case that (9), like (8), is well-formed, but it is not. The second 
reason is that if ve treat this rule as a clause deletion rule and 
accept Ross' analysis of action sentences, then we ca.n account for 
the occurrences of it in {T) a.nd {10) vith the same rule. 
(10) 	 I bate it that Joe married Sue and Bill hates it 
too. 
According to this hypothesis, (10) is derived from (11) and (7) from 
(12) br 	applications of the suggested rule of clause deletion. 
(11) 	 I hate it that Joe married Sue and Bill hates it 
that Joe married Sue too. 
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(12) 	 John did (NPit (sjohn stumbleds)NP)--he did. 
(Npit (8he stl.linbled8 }NP) in the park and he 
did (NPit (8he stumolea8 )NP) at noon. 
If this minor revision of Ross' analysis is correct then we have a  
second reason not to interpret the two occurrences of it in (7) as  
genuine anaphoric pronouns. · -
A third point that should be made, I think, is that even if the  
two occurrences of it in (7) a.re anaphoric pronouns, they are surely  
abstract ones, and, thus, would be like those that occur in (13)  
and (14).  
(13) My idea was rejected before it was even discussed. 
(14) 	 The fact that Joe died was brought to my attention 
before it was mentioned to Bill. 
The.occurrences of it in (13) and (14) are clearly anaphoric. However,  
we surely do not want to say that they are referential. It is  
difficult to see how. one could Justify assuming that the two occurrences  
of the abstract pronoun it in (7) are referential. ·  
As I noted earlier,Harman has suggested that Davidson's theory 
of action sentences is consistent with what is knovn of English syntax.· 
In support of this contention, he suggests a possible derivation of 
the action sentence (15). 
(15) John walked in the street. 
According to Harman, who, unlike Davidson, provides &n analysis of  
tense, (15) is derived from (16) by a rule of "precyclic relative  
clause formation" that maps (16) ·into (17).  
(16) (:lie) (pa.st e & walk j e & in es) . 
(17) (&e) (past e (walk j e (in e s))),. 
by a rule of 11 precyclic deletion of existentially quantified variable" 
that maps (17) into (18). 
(18) past (walk.1 (in s ) ) ,  
by a rule of "cyclic subject raising" that maps (18) into (19),  
(19) j 	 (past (wBfk (ins))), 
and finallyt by a rule of "tense incorporation" that ·maps (19) into  
(15), There are, so it seems to me, at least three flaws to Harman's  
proposed syntactic analysis. In.the first place, note that the  
occurrence of e in the second conjunct of (16) plays the dual role  
· or relative p~noun and head of a relative clause. That 1st this 
occurrence of e is the relative pronoun of the clause modifying the 
occurrence ore in the first conjunct of (16) and is the head or the 
relative clause consisting of the third conjunct of (16). But a single 
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con~tituent simply cannot play this dual role. Suppose that we have 
an Ullderlying structure something like that of (20}. 
(20) 	 John saw the boy and I saw the boy and the boy is 
happy. 
Given this underlying structure, Harms.n's rule of "precyclic relative 
clause formation" will allow us to derive (21). 
(21) *John sav the boy (~ (who is happy) I saw). 
In (21} the underlined occurrence of~ is playing the dual role of 
relative pronoun and head of a relative clause. As the deviance of 
this sentence suggests, a constituent simply cannot play this dual role. 
· The second flaw to Harman's proposed derivation is that, as far 
as I can see, it vill give the wrong surface structure to any sentence 
containing both a place and a time adverbial. Presumably, sentence 
(22) will be derived from an underlying structure something like (23). 
(22) John walked in the street at noon. 
(23) (:ire) (past e & walk j e & In e s & At e n) 
If I understand Harman, the result of applying "precyclic relative 
clause formation" and "precyclic deletion of existentially: quantified 
variable" to (23) would yield (2h), but (24) is clearly not the correct 
surface 	structure for (22) for it falsely claims that at noon is 
subordinate to in the street in (22). 
(24) pa.st (.ralk j (ins (at n))) 
The third flaw to this analysis is that to the degree that Harman's 
11precyclic relative clause formation" works at all it crucially 
depends on the conjuncts of a structure like (16) being in the order 
Harman gives or else it will generate word salad. This will require 
some very complicated deep structure constraints guaranteeing that the 
input to "precyclic relative clause formation" be such that it will 
generate a possible surface structure order. 
I would like to turn now to consider some semantic difficulties 
with Davidson's analysis. As we noted earlier, Davidson's analysis 
can account for the fact that (3) entails both (1) and (2). However, 
there a.re two important entailments of (3) that his analysis cannot 
account for. Note, for instance, that (3) entails both (25) and (26). 
(25) John was in the park. 
(26) John was in the park at noon. 
The difficulty with Davidson's analysis is that the logical form of 
(3} imputes no relationship between the subject of stumbled and the 
place a~verbial. As a result, if we adopt Davidson's analysis some 
novel semantic device must be postulated in order to account for the 
fact that (3) entails (25) and (26), or we must alter Davidson's 
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ana.J.ysis of (3) along the lines suggested by (27). 
(27) 	 (~x) (StUlllbled (John, x) & In (John, park) & 
At (x, noon)) 
However,,logical form (27j does not entail either (2) or (26). 
Thus, vithin the sort or framework Davidson presents, ve appear to 
be unable to account for all of the entailments or sentence (3). 
Davidson's analysis not only fails to account for some entailments 
of the action sentence (3), it provides for some rather dubious·ones. 
Observe, for instance, that logical form (5) entails both (28) and (29). 
(28) (!!Ie) (In (e, park)) · 
(29) (ae) (At Ce, noon)) 
It is not at all clear to me that (28) and (29) a.re semantically well 
formed. In any event, they certainly do not underlie any English 
sentences. 
One of the more serious flaws vith davidson's analysis ot action 
sentences is that it does not extend in any natural vay to sentences 
that describe states of affairs. Yet, as Romane Clark (1970) has 
observed, such sentences exhibit the same two problems that Kenny 
found in connection vith action sentences. As (30)-(32) shov, the 
predicate miserable is superficially variable in its polye.dicity. 
(30) John was miserable. 
(31) John was miserable in New York, 
(32) John was n,.iserable in New York last year. 
Moreover, (30).(32) exhibit the same sort of er.tailment relations 
shovn to obtain in connection vith (1)-{3). Sentence (32) entails 
both (30) and (31) and (31) entails (30). And, Just as (3) entails 
(25) and (26), (32) entails both (33) e.nd (34). 
(33) John was in New York. 
(34) John was in New York last year. 
It should be clear that we could provide an analysis of sentences 
describing states of a:tfairs analogous to that-provided by Davidson 
for action sentences if we were willing to quantify over states of 
affairs. Such a move would give rise to an analysis something like 
{35) for sentence (32). 
(35) 	 (is) (Mis (J, s) & In (s, N.Y.) & During {s, 
last year)) , · · 
Tbis analysis would allow us to treat miserable as stable in its 
polyadicity and allow us to account tor the tact that (32) entails 
{30) and (31) and that (31) entails (30). However, as with Davidson's 
analysis or action sentences, there are entailments of {32) that this 
analysis cannot capture (e.g. {33) and (34)) and some entailments 
18  
that are somewhat dubious (e.g. (36) and (37)). 
(36) (as) (In (s, N. Y. )) 
(37) (:[s) (During ( s; last year)) 
The fact that sentences describing states of affairs present 
essentially the same problems as ·action sentences insofar as adverbial 
modification is concerned suggests that a more general solution than 
has been offered by Davidson is in order. In what follows, I would 
like to present a sketch of an alternative analysis of the function 
of place and time adverbials in .action sentences and in sen~ences 
that describe states of affairs that can account for a wider class 
of entailments than does Davidson's analysis and which does not run 
afoul of the problem of variable polyadicity. 
In my Winter 1973 LSA paper (cf. M. Geis 1974a) I argued that 
{38) The function of place adverbials is to locate one 
or more of the participants of actions and 
states of affairs and the like in space. 
According to this view, the place adverbials of sentences like (2), 
(3), (31), and (32) originate in semantic structure in propositions 
like those that underlie sentence·s like (25) and (33). I presented 
the arguments for this position in M. Geis (1974b) and will assume its 
correctne·ss here. I also argued in the LSA paper cited that 
(39) 	 The function of time adverbials and of some 
elements of the auxiliary is to locate actions 
and states of affairs and the like in time. 
Jonnie Geis (1970) has provided an analysis of data like (31) 
and (32) which seems to me to be more promising than one based on 
quantification over states .of affairs, and which is consistent with 
hypotheses (38) and (39). She has argued that (31) and (32) are 
derived from (40) and (41), respectively, by rules that delete he was 
and while. 
(40) John was miserable while he was in New York. 
(41) 	 John was miserable while he was in New York last 
year. 
And, in M, Geis (1970) it is argued that while-clauses are relative 
clauses whose antecedent has been deleted~cording to this view, 
(40) and (41) are derived from something like (42) and (43), 
respect~vely, by a rule that deletes during the time (obligatorily 
for some speakers and optionally for others). 
(42) 	?John was miserable during the time while he was 
in New York. 
(43) 	?John was miserable during the time while he was 
in.New York last year. 
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In the works !cited, syntactic and :sem~ntic arguments are given for 
the sugges'!;ed analyses of (31) a.nd (32), Here I would like to 
point out that the proposed analyses or (31) and (32) are consistent 
with the entailment relations we observed in connection with these 
sentences. Sentences (41) and ( 43) , like (32) , entail (30) , ( 31) , 
(33) , and (34) . And, sentences (40) and (42) , like (31) , entail 
(30) and (33), Thus, the suggested analysis can account for a wider 
class of entailments than the analysis based on quantification over 
states of affairs. Moreover, the analysis is syntactically well 
motivated. 
J, Geis' analysis of data like (31) and (32) can be extended 
to some action sentences. Observe, for instance, that (44) and (45) 
are paraphrased by and have the same entailments as {46) and (47) 1 
respectively, 
(44) John worked on time adverbials in his hotel room. 
(45) 	 John worked on time adverbials in his hotel last 
night. 
{46) John worked on time adverbials (?during the time) 
while he was in his hotel room. 
{47) 	 John worked on time adverbials (?during the time) 
while he was in his hotel room last night. 
On the other hand, this analysis clearly cannot be extended to all 
action sentences. Sentence (48), for instance, is not only not a 
paraphrase of (3)~ it is in fact semantically deviant, 
(48) *John stumbled while he was in the park at noon. 
Before suggesting an analysis of (3), let us note that J, Geis' 
analysis of the while-clause lqcatives of data like (31), (32), (44), 
and (45) is consistent with hypotheses (38) and (39), for the 
postul~ted remote structures consist of two clauses, one describing 
a dated action or state of affairs and the other describing a dated 
spatial predication, itself a dated state of affairs. Moreover, 
the postulated remote structures·or (31), (32), (44), and (45) 
seem to have the same entailments that these sentences do. What we 
require is a theory of the logical forms of these sentence! and of 
their remote structures which can account for these, entailment! 
without appeal to novel semantic devices (if possible), Moreover, 
ve need an analysis of data like (3) • 
. In what follovs, I would like to present a more preci~e 
statement of hypothesis (39), show that data like {3) are consistent 
with it, and.then suggest logical forms for sentences containing 
while-clause locatives. It will not be possible in the time 
remaining to provide a serious defense of the proposed theory. 
However, I hope it will have the virtue or being sufficiently precise 
to be testable.  
I would like to suggest that the canonical form for any action  
sentence or sentence describing a state of affairs is as in (49),  
···.--~--- ------------- -· -~ ---- -
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where g_ is a quantifier, capital 1 is a-temporal sentential operator, 
one of whose lexical realizations is at, Sis a "bare bones" 
description of a state of affairs or acti";n, lover case tis a 
variable-ranging over points in time, and Tri is one of the relations 
earlier than, later than, or equals. -
( 49) (Qt ) ( T ( S , t ) & Tn ( t , now)) 
According to this viev, a sentence like (1) will be represented as 
in (50). · 
(50) (:a:t) (T (Stumble ( j), t) & Earlier (t, nov)) 
Logical 	form (50) also underlies sentence (51). 
(51) John stumbled at some time. 
That (1) and (51) should have the same logical form is supported by 
the fact that they are logically equivalent. Datum (52) also 
supports this view. 
(52) 	 John stumbled and the reason is that no one was 
holding him up at the time. 
The adverbial at the time in (52) is clearly anaphoric, referring 
back to 	the time at which John stumbled. The proposal that (1) has 
the same underlying structure as (51) provides an anaphor in 
semantic structure for this anaphoric time adverbial. 
Before giving analyses of (2) and (3), let me suggest that a 
sentence like (25) should be represented as in (53), where AT is a 
primitive locative relation, whose lexical realization is at, E. 
is a variable ranging over points in space, E, which is realized as 
in, is the relation "is a member of", and PARK is a. name standing 
for a. set o~ places. 
(53) 	 (:a:t) (:a:p) (T (AT (j, p), t) & Earlier (t, now) 
& (p E: PARK)) 
One of the virtues of such an analysis is that it enables us to 
account for the fact that (25) entails (54). 
(54) John was at some place. 
I would like now to suggest that (2) has logical form (55), 
(55) 	 (:a:t) (:3:p) (T (Stumble (j), t) & Earlier (t, now) 
& T (AT (j, p), t) &·p € PARK) 
Observe, that given this representation for (2) we can account for 
the fact that (2) entails (1) and (25)., the latter entailment being 
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impossible on Davidson's analysis. Moreover, ve can account for the 
fact that (2) entails (56), something Davidson's analysis cannot do. 
(56) 	 At the time vhen John stumbled, he was in the · 
park. 
Turning 	to (3), I would suggest a logical form something like (57). 
(57) 	 (at) (3:p) (T (Stumble (J), t) & Earlier (t, now) & 
(t = noon) &T (AT (j, p), t) & (p ~ PARK)) 
Given this representation for (3), we can account for the fact ·that 
(3) entails (1), (2), (25) and (26). As ve noted earlier, Davidson's 
analysis cannot account for the latter tvo entailments of (3). More-
over, the suggested analysis can also account for the fact that (3) 
entails (58), something Davidson's analysis cannot do. 
(58) John stumbled at noon and he va.s in the park then. 
The proposed analysis of (2) and (3) would appear to be well 
motivated semantically. Data (59) and (60) provide a quasi~syntactic 
argument for these analyses. 
(59) 	 John stumbled in the park; at the time he vas 
walking with his eyes closed. · 
(60) 	 John stumbled in the park a.t noon; at the time 
he was walking with his eyes cloeed. 
The adverbial at the time in (59) and (60) can be interpreted as 
meaning "at the time John stumbled". The proposed logical forms for 
(2) and (3) can account for how ve interpret at the time in these 
sentences, for (55) and (57) provide anaphora for this anaphoric 
time adverbial. Although this quui-syntactic argument supports the 
proposed logical forms for (2) and (3), I must confess that I have 
no very. clear idea how to map (55) and (57) into (2) and (3). 
Let us nov turn to data like (31), (32), (44), and (45), i.e. 
to sentences containing while-clause locatives. In order to provide 
logical forms for these sentences ve must, if their proposed remote 
structures are correct, provide e.na.lyses of adverbials like during 
the time and while. In M. Geis (1970), I argued that vhile is 
derived from 'at'i'ie adverbial something like throughoutsome time. 
Thus, if we are to account for while-clause locatives ve must provide 
an analysis for the adverbials of sentences like. (61) and (62). · 
(61) John was miserable during the winter quarter. . 
(62) John was in Nev York throughout the winter quarter. 
What follows is a speculative treatment of the adverbials of (61} and 
(62), and of sentences containing while-clause locatives. 
· Adverbials like during the.winter quarter are typically ambiguous. 
On one reading, during the winter quarter has a meaning something like 
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11during some part of the winter quarter" and on the other it ha.s a 
meaning something like "all during the winter quarter". Let us 
call this latter interpretation the 11durative" interpretation, and 
the former the "nondurative11 interpretation. 
It is vorth pointing out, I think, that (31) and (32) are 
ambiguous in. the same Yay that (61) is. This is one of the 
motivations for postulating (42) and (43) as the remote structures 
for (31) and (32), respectively. I would suggest (63a) and (63b) 
as analyses of the two interpretations of (61), where WQ is a name 
standing for the set of times that make up the winter quarter in 
question. 
(63) a. {at) [T (Miserable (j), t) & Earlier (t, now) 
& (t E WQ)J 
b. (Vt) {(tE WQ):::, CT (Miserable (j), t) & 
Earlier (t, now)J} 
The representation of the adverbial throughout the winter quarter 
clearly contains a universal quantifier. I suggest (64) as an 
analysis of the logical form for (62), where NYC is a name that 
stands for the set of places comprising New York City. 
(64) 	 (:11:p) {(pE-NYC) & (Vt) [(tE-WQ)::;)(Earlier (t, now) 
& T (At ( j , p) , t ) ) 1} 
As I noted earlier, these representations are quite speculative. 
However, in their defense I would point out that tbe two ~epresentations 
given in (63) allow us to account for the fact that (61) entails (65) 
on both of its readings, and representation (64) enables us to 
account for the fact that (62) entails (66). 
(65) 	 There was a time at vhich John was miserable. 
(66) 	 There was a time at which John was in New York. 
With this background, let us return to sentences containing 
while-clause locatives. Sentences (32) and (41) were said to be 
derived from a remote structure something like (43). I would like to 
suggest that (43), and thus (32) and (41), has a logical form something 
like (67) on the durative interpretation of these sentences. 
(67) 	 · (3:r) {Period (r) & 
(Vti) [ ( ti E: r) :::> (Earlier ( t 1 , nov) & 
T (Miserable (j), ti))J & 
(~p) C(p E- NYC) & (r CLY) & 
(vt) ( (tj E: r) -::J (Earlier (tj, now) & T (AT (j, p). tj)) )J} · 
In (67), E._ is a set of times and LY is a name standing fqr the set 
of times comprising the last year in question. The logical form 
for the nondurative interpretation of (32), (41), and (43), differs 
from (67) in that Vt; is replaced by :11:t; and the first conditional 
operator is replaced by a conjunction operator. 
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The assignment of logical form (67) and its nondurative variant 
to (32}, (41), and (43) enables us to account for the fact that 
these sentences entail (30), {31), (33), and (34). We arrive at 
(31), for example, by dropping.the conjunct r C -LY from (61). We 
arrive at (30) by dropping the last two lines of (67}. We arrive 
at (34) by dropping the second and third lines of (67), and vc arrive 
at (42) by dropping the second and third lines of (67) and the 
conjunct re. LY. 
Although the analyses of the action sentences (2) and (3) and 
of the state of affairs sentence (32) are speculative, the approach 
suggested here, which is ba.sed on·quantification over times, as 
opposed to quantification over events, seems to me to be superio~ to 
Davidson's on several grounds. It accounts for adverbial modification 
in both action sentences and sentences describing states of affairs. 
It accounts for a wider class of entailments of sentences containing 
time and place adverbials than does Davidson's, and it does not 
involve postulating unmotivated entities such as Davidson's term 
referring to events in the logical forms of sentences. 
Footnotes 
*This paper is in·essentially the same form as that read at  
the summer meeting of the LSA, July 1974, and represents a partial  
draft of a longer study of time and place adverbials which is in  
progress. I am indebted to Bill Lycan for his comments on ·a  
previous draft of this paper.  
1. Two representative passages from Davidson:  
Concerning the anaiysis of action verbs Davidson (1967: 92)  
writes·:  
The basic idea is that verbs of action--verbs that say "what  
someone did''--should be construed as containing a place, for  
singular terms or variables, that they do not appear to. For  
example, we would normally suppose that "Shem kicked Shaun"  
consisted in tvo names and a two-place predicate. I suggest,  
though, that we think of "kicked" as a ~-place predicate,  
and that the sentence be given in this form:  
(17) (~x) (Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x}) 
If we try for an English sentence that directly reflects this 
form, wclrun into difficulties, "There is en event~ such 
that .!. is a kicking of Shue.n by Shemn is a.bout the best I 
can do •• · •. 
Concerning the analysis of adverbs, Davidson (1969: 219f.} 
· writes: 
Adverbial modification is ••• logically on a ps.r with adjectival 
modification: what adverbial clauses (sic} modify is not 
verbs, but the .events that certain verbs introduce. "Sebastian 
24 
·	str.olled through the streets of Balog. a at 2 a.m." then has 
this form: "There is an event x such that Sebastian 
strolled x, x took place in the-streets of Bologna, and x 
was goingon-at 2 a.m~" 
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